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1.  Introduction 
This paper intends to contribute to the current debate about the need of social and 
productive technological change in LDCs. In particular, we analyse micro-enterprises and 
SMEs' role in the tecno-economic paradigm change. Although commonly associated to 
either traditional and retardant forces, the point we wish to make is that the vast majority 
of the latent and emergent entrepreneurial force (i.e. micro-enterprises and SMEs) in 
LDCs, at present largely disconnected from the national and transnational economic 
circuit, represent a huge potential for the techno-economic paradigm change. By analogy, 
these latent forces represent what Albert Einstein taught us about whereby a single brick 
can be made to release a huge amount of energy in the form of an atomic explosion (De 
Soto 2000).  Latent entrepreneurship is comparable to the potential nuclear energy in 
Einstein's brick, however, as should be clear by the end of the paper, our examination 
departs from that of the De Soto´s in some important aspects.  
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Traditionally, the common association between microenterprises/SMEs and 
national/transnational globalised firms is basically one of exploitative labour or maquila-
type of contractual relations, in some cases. In other cases, this relation is studied under 
the NGO´s/social responsability point of view, and, in other cases, they are limited to a 
competitive relation under unfair or illegal frameworks within the formal/informal 
duality.  Under our study the association is between social entrepreneurship and 
cooperative networking relations under the presumption that microenterprises/SMEs have 
an economic knowledge-related advantage to offer to the globalised and interconnected 
economic system. These interconnections are based on an underlying strategy that seems 
could work well both ways. Microenterprises and SMEs cannot be just underestimated or 
ignored as something that will be absorbed or replaced but can rather be interconnected 
with the globalised economic circuit through the concept of social entrepreneurship for 
the generation of networking capabilities.  
 
That is why we appeal to another typology of firms and to Granovetter´s “embeddedness” 
argument, in which interconnections are central. Latin America, together with Africa and 
Middle East, according to The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM hereafter), count 
with the highest number of necessity-based entrepreneurship2 in the world. In effect, 
whilst in the developed world, in average, one (1) entrepreneur out of ten (10) is based in 
necessity, in Latin America this same kind of entrepreneurship is 4 times greater (!), that 
is, for every 10 entrepreneurs in Latin America, approximately, 4 come out of necessity. 
                                                 
2  Firms that were founded by unemployed individuals who chose to become self-employed by 
starting a new firm. 
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Hence, the “Latin American way” of entrepreneurship, by its own nature, has different 
connotations from the rest of the world. Unfortunately, the implicit target “back in the 
head” of policy makers and researchers is still opportunity-based entrepreneurship3. 
 
The general idea that emerges from this research is the need in the Latin American 
economic system to reduce the inequity and disconnection between necessity-based 
entrepreneurship and opportunity-based entrepreneurship through the social 
entrepreneurship for generation of networking capabilities. There is a need for 
institutional change based not only on commercial and labour contracts (e.g. 
formalization and tax incentives differentiated between companies), but also in 
generating organizational capabilities to build dense networks of cohesion, trust, 
inclusiveness and integration of necessity-based firms that are marginalized from the 
economic system circuit of the opportunity-based firms. A similar set of ideas were 
pointed out by Arthur Lewis and, in Colombia, by Professor Lauchlin Currie (Lewis 1954 
and 1955, Currie 1974, 1981 and 1997). Their ideas were related to the integration of 
undervalued, low-skilled labour into productive activities with backward and forward 
linkages, or so-called “leading sectors” (such as construction and exports). The foci in 
this paper are inter-firms´ relations, rather than simply the absorption of large masses of 
low-skilled rural immigrants. 
                                                 
3  Firms that were founded based on the perception of a business opportunity. The distinction 
between “opportunity-based” and “necessity-based” entrepreneurial activity has been given highlighted by 
surveys  conducted by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) as a way to distinguish between 
countries where new firm creation occurs mostly due to opportunity recognition from those where new firm 
creation occurs mostly to escape unemployment. If unemployment is the main incentive for setting up a 
business, there may not be time to look for good opportunities, make detailed plans, and seek advice. Thus, 
independent from productivity and/or learning effects that occur after start-up, chances of survival may be 
affected by selection effects occurring prior to start-up. 
 




This paper develops a model based on the network theory (Granovetter 1973, 1985, 
Powell and Grodal 2005), the problem of exploitation and exploration of knowledge 
(Nooteboom 2002) and the work of Deutsh (1973), and Lazaric and Raybaut (2005). It 
studies the role that necessity- and opportunity-based firms have in a developing society 
that intends to ascend in the technological ladder towards greater added value and 
complex activities by determining the role of each type of firms in organizations´ 
knowledge generation processes.  
 
The model has the following stylized organizational structures. The first organizational 
structure is the necessity-based firm: we assume that networks in this case are of the 
parochial type (Bowles and Gintis 2004), in which there are relations within family, 
ethnic groups, or cliques that achieve high levels of cooperation whilst excluding other 
type of groups. This firm is characterized for having an entrepreneur that creates a firm in 
order to escape unemployment; he or she contacts close individuals (family and/or 
friends), generating an organizational structure with strong ties. The second stylized 
organizational structure is the opportunity-based firm: this type of organization is created 
after an individual ends a relation with an existent firm (as worker, provider, client, etc.). 
The entrepreneur teams up with individuals through weak ties, embedded in communities 
conformed by experts, assessors, consultants, or learning, innovation or socialization 
networks (Stephenson 2000).  
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The opportunity-based firms are closely related to the Schumpeterian type of 
entrepreneurship which explores new knowledge —known also as equilibrium-disturbing 
entrepreneur—, whilst the necessity-based firms are closely related to the Kirznerian type 
of entrepreneurship which exploits new uses of knowledge —known also as equilibrium-
creating entrepreneur— (Grebel, Pyka and Hanusch 2004).  These two types of 
entrepreneurship maintain the system out-of-equilibrium as centripetal and centrifugal 
forces, strengthening the capacity of absorption (accumulation+assimilation) of 
technology and knowledge in a developing country (Nelson and Pack 1999).  
 
The model explains the dynamics by which both types of firms have some needs that are 
complemented by each other. This generates a creative encounter through  inter-firms' 
cooperation networks for learning and the difussion of information and knowledge.  The 
necessity-based firms (familiar/tradicional/parochial), with a strong impact over national 
employment in LDCs but, at the same time, in low productivity and innovation activities. 
On the other hand, opportunity-based firms embedded in complex business networks and 
greater value-added and innovative activities, but without major employment generation. 
 
Cooperation, competition and  indifference 
Deutsch (1973)  assumes that the individuals and groups work to satisfy their own 
interests, thriving to reach their goals. However, the search of their particular and selfish 
interests  need not necesarily contradict the unfolding of collaboration and teamworking. 
Deutsch emphasized on goal´s perception determines how agents interact and the models 
of the interaction, in turn, determine the results.    




The goals can be cooperative, competitive or independently related (chart 1). If agents 
consider that their goals are correlated positively (i.e. if others reach or at least come 
closer toward their goals, then we also come closer to our own goals), cooperative 
behaviour ensues. If agents perceive that their goals are correlated negatively with the 
goals of others (i.e . we perceive that if the others reach their goals then it makes less 
probable our own goal achievement) , competitive  behaviour ensues. On other side, if 
agents perceive that the achievement of other agent's goals are independent of ours, then 
indifference behaviour ensues. 
 
Table 1 - Cooperation, competition and indifference 
Expectations about others 
With goals correlated: 
 
Positively Negatively 
With independent goals 
We  We can wait the 
others will 
cooperate 
We can wait the 
others will 
compete 
We can wait the others 
will be indifferent 
Based in Deutch (1973) and Wong and Yu (2004). 
 
If members of a team understand that their goals are critically cooperative or they are, on 
the contrary, competitive or independent talvez between each other, this affects their 
expectations, interactions and results. People with cooperative goals - ie. the achievement 
of other others helps our goal - they take actions so that others do well. Under these 
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circumstances it is expected that all use their abilities to work in mutual benefit. 
However, under competition - ie. some work for their own goals at the expensse of the 
achievements of others - people conceal or withhold information and ideas as they protect 
their own goals; they can even be tempted to obstruct the progress of others or take 
advantage of their co-workers (i.e. role of opportunism). In this way, people want "to 
win" the competition and so they need others to "lose". With independent goals, people 
hope the individuals of a group work for their own goals with small or no regard for the 
goals of others. As there are few incentives to use their abilities in benefit of others, they 
abstain of interacting and show indifference in the face of the progress of others. 
 
Cyclical behavior between cooperation, competition and indifference 
 
Accordingly, the behavior of agents varies along three roles depending on the perception 
of the goals, which influence in actions and production. We will model in the following 
sections the variation of the working hours agent engaged in each role in an instant of 
time t. When an agent assumes the competition role, she tends to take advantage of the 
co-workers in search of new information and she concentrates on her own interests at the 
detriment of others´ interests. But when an agent assumes the role of collaboration, she 
frequently interacts with, shares information and learns from co-workers. The agent that 
assumes the role of indifference expects others to work focused on their own goals with 
little or any consideration for her own goal. 
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A person can assume all the roles but in different instants of time. A worker can assume 
in this way in the course of only one day the roles of collaboration, indifference and 
competition. For this reason we use terms as collaboration/indifference/competition 
"roles" and not collaborative/indifferent/competitive as "agents", and units of measure 
being working hours and not in number of agents. 
 
The variation of the competition, indifference and collaboration roles is based on the 
cycle of the firm. The following section shows the recurrent behavior in which a high 
competition level precedes a high cooperation level and vice versa. Within these periods 
exists one period of both high competition and high cooperation. When there are low 
levels in the role of both competition and collaboration, it is because there are high levels 
of indifference or independence of goals among the members of the firm. 
 
Cycle of the firm 
 
a. Foundation 
During the foundation of a firm that seeks to supply a recently discovered and unsatisfied 
necessity of the consumers, begins to interweave the interrelations in the individuals´ 
goals inside an organization. However, at the beginning, it is not clearly defined how 
agents are correlated to each other (Figure 1). That is to say, an essential problem is 
presented inside the organization: according to Wong and Yu (2004), it has not been 
generated a shared vision nor cooperative goals. The implicit risk and uncertainty is that 
the competition settles down a new trajectory in the organization: it doesn't stop of being 
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a latent threat - but not unavoidable - inside the organizations. The teams have reasons to 
believe that they can be exploited by other co-workers, who openly work for their own 
interests and not for the collective benefit. The competition is not simply a necessary 
consequence of having selfish co-workers but, in effect, it is a possible trajectory of the 
firm. Depending on the perceptions of goal correlation the members of an organization 
recognize that the interests are cooperatively related and the organization can enter in a 
trajectory of minimum competition and, generally, teams are able to prepare better to 
work efficiently. 
 
b. Phase of exploitation: low competition and high cooperation (you put correlated 
positively)   
   
The challenge that a firm faces in this period is to induce agents to work as a team in 
favor of the entrepreneur's idea, which just begins to be communicated and understood 
among its members.  The leader's innate abilities (i.e. eloquence, persuasion, patience and 
persistence, sympathy and trust, etc.) are crucial in this point through the informal 
communication. The attainment of goals and the cognitive processes that operate to 
communicate the particularities and the restrictions of the business idea, generate levels 
of regularity among the whole existent subjective variation in the business conception. 
The coordination costs are highly specific and "sunken" (to See Figure 1). 
 
Witt (1999) indicates that the exercise of leadership bears some inherent risks, because it 
depends on the quality and interest that the conception of the business idea wakes up 
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among the members of the organization. The success or failure of this conception 
depends on its quality and in the way it affects the material conditions of the employees 
(remuneration, benefits, opportunities, career options, working conditions). If this causes 
satisfaction (or disutility) among the employees, the manager's leadership can consolidate 
(or turn out to be affected negatively). 
 
Also, Witt (1999) emphasizes that the communication, particularly the non formal 
available through the socialization networks inside the firm, allows the agents to observe 
and to compare the behavior of other agents. If there is more frequent and more intense 
observations of other people, then the better the internal representations of subjective 
knowledge - 'tacit' – are, so that they can be understood and acquired through imitation.  
In fact, the socialization with others and the unconscious imitation of certain behavior 
features spreads to induce cognitive regularities among the individuals and to generate 
expectations of collective behavior. In this way, team working develops a common 
direction, identity, values, integrated roles, common tasks, personal interrelations, and the 
distributions of shared prizes that reinforce the interdependence of the combined 
cooperative goal. 
 
c. Phase of exploitation and exploration: high competition and high cooperation 
(positively and negatively correlated goals)   
  The constant necessity that organizations face to "import" new knowledge is a threat to 
the teamwork and the sunken and specific coordination costs of the firm. First, the 
personnel's rotation that entails the selection of ideas inside a firm or, second, the new 
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recruiting to generate a capacity of absorption of new technologies and the learning of 
new information (to see section 7.1.1 of the chapter one), both represent external threats 
to the regularities in the firm that new intra-organizational challenges  impose.  The high 
competition among groups of the firm and the high cooperation to diffuse their own ideas 
within these groups, are a characteristic at this stage.    
 
The organizations face two types of problems in this following phase:    
   
1) Hire employees to explore new knowledge or    
2) Create within the firm the knowledge that is required so they do not have to take a risk 
some cohesion and idiosyncratic elements that characterize the organizational culture of 
the firm (Simón 1991, p. 128).   
   
d. Exploration Phase: high competition and low cooperation (negatively correlated goals)   
 The growing necessity of specialized knowledge entails a high competition of ideas and, 
hence, the displacement of old ideas for new ones. A conflict is generated between those 
who represent the status quo and those who represent the necessity of change. The 
diffusion of new ideas requires new recruitings and, in turn, implies the displacement of 
other ideas so that new knowledge is explored or is generated within the firm.  This 
implies a rotation of personnel due to the entrance and exit of agents within the firm. 
When hiring new agents to replace the salient ones, a period of decrease in cooperation 
due to the destruction of old routines and an increment of perceptions of non-correlated 
goals or a higher cognitive distance with the new members of the firm (see figure 1). 




e. Re-starting the cycle   
 A new phase of low cooperation and low competition occurs when a "creative 
destruction" replaces old ideas for new ones. There is no clear perception of goals´ 
interdependence or among agent's roles. The cycle of convergences and divergences 
engenders a new cycle of a reconverted and modernized firm. 
 
Limits and scope of the model   
   
This firm cycle may not present itself exactly in the deterministic order described here, 
but the model intends to pick up the variety and implicit dynamics of the teamwork and 
coordination and subsequent reconstruction due to the need of cohesion and 
"importation" of new ideas (Simon 1991).  The pattern of Lotka and Volterra adapted to 
pick up this cycle by means of a predator-prey model shows the levels of collaboration 








Results of simulations denote three differences between the two organizational structures.  




First, there is a greater control in the dynamics of the competition/collaboration cycle 
within the organizational structure of the necessity-based firm (see Figure 2 (a)), since the 
oscillations are much more stable that in the case of the opportunity-based firm (see 
Figure 2 (b)). What characterized the necessity-based firms are the centralized channels 
of diffusion of information through an entrepreneurial leader which takes care of 
volatility of competition/collaboration cycle based on strong ties and networking. 
 
Figure 2 - Variance of the competition/collaboration cycle 
  (a)       (b) 




Second, the speed to which the communication among agents is carried out in order to 
adopt other´s practices depends strongly on the organizational structure of the company. 
In this way, the diffusion of best practices information spreads more rapidly within the 
opportunity-based firm (see Figure 3 (b)) than in the necessity-based firm (see Figure 3 





















































Figure 3 - Adoption of Practices 
   (a)     (b) 





As last remark, the adoption of new information and knowledge in the firm is carried out 
more efficiently under the organizational structure of the opportunity-based firm (see 
Figure 4 (b)). The most relevant innovations are incorporated by the agents of this type of 








































Figure 4 – Incorporation of new knowledge. 
   (a)     (b) 





Necessity-based firms have a significant weight in an economy in developing countries 
(GEM 2007). These firms count with strong ties (Powell and Grodal 2005) through which 
an effective social control and learning of tacit knowledge can be exercised (see Figure 
2). That is to say, they play the important role of cohesion by means of strong ties among 
the members of the firms: their practices tend to converge toward one objective so that 
regularities can be generated in the expectations of the others´ behavior.  However, the 
new data and the new information in this type of firm do not incorporate easily or quickly 
to the practices of the individuals in the firm. This entails that innovative activities cannot 
be absorbed easily; this structure places, hence, new knowledge in the periphery for a 
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Kirznerian-type of entrepreneur, which is based on the second order learning (i.e. new 
use of existent knowledge), based on people interacting regularly and, therefore, having a 
low cognitive distance. However, when the cognitive distance is low, interactions with 
new people are few, and then the biggest advantage is taken from existent people. That is 
to say, under this structure, we obtain more, but of the same things. 
 
On the other side, opportunity-based firm do not have as significant weight in developing 
countries as in developed countries. They are characterized to have communities in the 
form of networks and weak ties by means of which new data and new knowledge 
incorporates quicker in the practices of the firms´ agents. This structure is easily induced 
in innovative activities (Figure 4). In this way, its structure admits the access again to 
knowledge and its strength are more productive and innovative activities. However, this 
same structure can generate filtration of information due to its weak ties and, hence, 
weakens the cohesion among the members in order to standardize best practices.  
 
The following Table 2 summarizes the former analysis. 
 
Table 2 – Schumpeterian (oportunidad-based) and Kirznerian (necessity-based) 
entrepreneurs 






Information leakage or 
filtration 
Exploration: first order 
learning processes  (in the 







sense of Nooteboom 2000) 
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Strong social control social of 
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An especially useful conclusion for firms in the developing countries context in emergent 
economies are based in the simulations results. These suggest that each type of firm, like 
those based on necessity and on opportunity, have an important role or function to play in 
the techno-economic change. The relative advantage of the opportunity-based companies 
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is the reduction of " cognitive myopia " or higher absorption of new-incoming 
information, for example, of foreign technology and therefore for the "import" of the 
innovations, which makes it a key institution for the stage of "accumulation" phase of the 
tecnoeconomic paradigm (in terms of Perez (2002) is the irruption and frenzy phases). 
While the necessity-based firms are more effective in exercising the basic function of the 
intra-organizational learning of tacit knowledge and the control of opportunistic behavior 
and the promotion of cooperation, which transforms it into a key institution for the 
“assimilation” phase of technologies (Nelson and Pack 1999). There is no, hence, 
“optimal” organizational structure, but rather each structure has relative advantages, 
depending on the context and the time.  
 
But there is no diffused new knowledge until there is a real distributed system of 
knowledge among the minds of producers and consumers of a society that have really 
been impacted by this new technologies in a technological diffusion process. This 
includes not only the accumulative aspect but also the technological assimilation (Nelson 
and Pack 1999, Nelson and Sampat 2000) of mass produced goods and services to the 
"Bases of Economic Pyramid" especially by means of the inherent advantage of the 
necessity-based firms (Prahalad 2005). The ignorance of the relative advantages and the 
existent disconnection between the opportunity-based and necessity-based is a decisive 
factor in this investigation.  
 
These two types of entrepreneurship complement each other in strengthening the capacity 
of absorption (accumulation+assimilation) of technology and knowledge in a developing 
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country. These results are strongly related to the co-evolution between accumulation and 
assimilation of technology in terms of Nelson and Pack (1999), and also other authors 
like Perez (2002) and Lundvall (2003). The models explains the dynamics by which both 
type of organization structures have demands and supplies that complement each other to 
generate a creative encounter by means of inter-firms´collaboration networking for 
learning and diffusion of knowledge in an economy.  The necessity-based firms 
(familiar/parochial), have a strong impact over the impact of the employment of a 
developing country and, at the same time, are located in low productivity and innovation 
activities. On the other hand, opportunity-based firms (embedded in complex business 
and high-technology networking) are located in activities with higher added-value and 
innovation, but that are not generating a big impact on employment.  
 
The following Figure presents the dynamics or interface between necessity and 
opportunity-based firms, addressed in this research. 





Both classes of firms have an important role in the change and advancement in the 
techno-paradigm. Moreover, the paradox is that opportunity-based companies, as 
suggested by the evidence and the results of the research, rely on the relative advantage 
of neccesity-based companies to generate agreements and understandings on the 
economic and social needs in a society. However, despite this co-dependence between 
opportunity and necessity-based firms in developing countries, the “survival” firms are 
often under the law and in economic terms, in a situation of vulnerability and instability 
compared to opportunity-based firms. It is in cases like this that the inter-firms´ relations 
should be transformed to a new kind of relations based on cooperation. Connectivity in 
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(which are not discarded), but also on other type of institutions that allow learning, 
organization, absorption, adaptation and innovation and knowledge generation in the 
context of business opportunities and profits for all parties, in response to economic and 
social needs. The results presented in this research involve therefore a process of 
collective learning and innovation capabilities.  
 
A similar set of ideas were pointed out, and even materialized through economic policies 
implemented decades ago, by development theorists such as Arthur Lewis, Nobel laureate 
in economics, and in Colombia, by Professor Lauchlin Currie in the early 70s (Lewis 
1954 and 1955, Currie 1974, 1981 and 1997). Their ideas were related to the integration 
of underutilized, unemployed (or at least disguisedly unemployed), low-skilled labour 
(including agriculture) into productive activities and sectors with backward and forward 
linkages of value-added chains (especially with forward linkages), or so-called leading 
sectors (such as construction and exports). The locus presented in this paper are the 
relationships inter-firms in a world of technological information flows, rather than simply 
based on the work and contractual relations for the absorption of large masses of low-
skilled rural immigrants. Of course, it must be emphasized that there is an inherent risk 
which is to reproduce the same subordinate relations that workers have intra-firm into 
inter-firms´ relations, rather than the collaborating and cohesive networks we are looking 
for between firms. However, the access to the great mass of consumers of scarce 
resources that necessity-based and informal entrepreneurs have access could be a 
deterrent for big businesses to exploit them. 
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This strategy of economic development, paraphrasing Hirschman, concentrates surplus on 
integrating forces in the economic system to link, enhance and channel existing social 
relations, recombining and reconfiguring them in the economic system. This is a social 
innovation, which requires social entrepreneurs, that are called to generate this type of 
networking capabilities. The problem now relies on the equality in the “barter terms” of 
exchange between these types of firms. Future research on social entrepreneurship based 
on cases such as Grammen Bank, Juan Valdez, E+Co, Parquesoft and the alliance 
between big food suppliers and neighborhood small stores  (Guarin 2007, Hernandez 
2008), among many other cases, might introduce us to wide range of examples and how 
just (or unjust for the matter) social entrepreneurship can be done. Forthcoming research 
should present to us some first cases that exemplify the main results of the model 




The model of Lotka and Volterra 
   
The following model of duality between firms analyzes the paper of the networking 
mechanisms intra-firm and the conflict between opportunism (i.e. competiton) and 
cooperation based mainly in Deutch (1973), Lazaric and Raybout (2005) and Nooteboom 
(2000). The objective of this work is to study the intraorganizational learning by means of 
contacts in a network, the generation of knowledge and diversity of performance between 
firms and its implications. 
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The individuals that engage in the competitive or opportunism role tend to take advantage 
of the co-workers in search of knowledge and they follow their own interests given 
negatively correlated goals; while the agents engaged in the role of collaboration interact 
frequently, share information and learn of their co-workers. 
 
When analyzing in the previous section the dynamics of the previous role, we find a 
similarity exists between opportunism´ (highly competitive) roles and collaboration with 
the predator-prey pattern of Lotka and Volterra. For our case, the individuals engaged in 
the competitive or opportunistic role have a relationship with the behavior of the 
“predators” and the individuals engaged in the collaborative role are associated with 
“preys”. However, opportunism-collaboration's dynamics present some differences 
regarding that of Lotka and Volterra.   
   
About the assumptions of the dynamics, the following equations model those dynamics.   
 
In the dynamics of the collaborative and opportunistic roles in the instant t, we suppose 
that: 
 
• In absence of opportunism, the dynamics of collaboration increases proportionally 
to the current working hours of agents engaged in opportunism; that is to say that, 
 when . ((  is the rate of the collaboration growth in the instant 
t.).  




• In absence of collaboration, the dynamics of opportunism increases proportionally 
to the current working hours of agents engaged in opportunism; , when 
(   is the rate of the opportunism growth.). 
 
• The growth rates do not make reference to  and  having positive sign, given 
that it is possible these rates having negative sign. 
 
• The form how the collaboration and opportunism interact will depend on the 
probability that opportunism has of obtaining information, the probability that that 
an agent engaged in collaboration allows in time t an agent engaged in 
opportunism obtain information and the respective current working hours of 
agents engaged in opportunism. In this way, the growth ratio of opportunism is 
 and growth ratio of collaboration is . Where  and  they are the 
probabilities that an agent engaged in opportunism obtains information of an 
agent engaged in collaboration and that he or she allows the former to obtain 
information at his or her detriment, respectively. 
 
• Both working hours of agents engaged in each role are homogeneous, that is, 
factors like the age or the gender are not accounted for. 
 
• The encounters between agents engaged in collaboration and opportunism are 
equally probable. 








  (2) 
 
To analyze the terms of each equation we are based in the Lazaric´s and Raybout´s 
(2005) model. The expression (1) indicates that the dynamics of the collaboration role 
varies in an instant t and is given by the difference between the product of the rate of 
collaboration' growth and the current working hours of agents engaged in collaboration 
and, the product between the probability that the agent engaged in opportunism obtains 
information from the agent engaged in collaboration and the current working hours of 
agents engaged in opportunism. 
 
Lets observe the following example: suppose that the current working hours of agents 
engaged in collaboration is x and that of opportunism is ; if the probability that an agent 
engaged in opportunism obtains information is high, this probability tends to 1, then by 
multiplying it by the population of opportunism the product is almost y, hence it makes 
sense to subtract the rate of collaboration' growth times the population of collaboration.  
 
Similarly the equation (2) indicates that the variation of opportunism in an instant t is 
given by the difference between the product of the rate of opportunism' growth and the 
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current population and, the product between the probability that the collaboration allows 
the opportunism to obtain information times the current working hours of agents engaged 
in collaboration. 
 
To understand the equation (1) we define the neighborhood of individuals that share 
information in firm like  and we consider tΩ  as the matrix of contacts in an instant t. 
 
Contacts are represented by  which is an element that belongs to the matrix of contacts. 
For  we have that  if their organizational practice  is bigger than that of 
the individual i and the cognitive distance between  and   tend to zero. In other 
words, information is shared with those that have a bigger organizational practice to their 




the group of individuals with those that the agent  shares information in the 




Hence  and the number of individuals that share information in the firm 
corresponds to the cardinal of this group ( ). 
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It is this way,  represents the positive growth rate of collaboration in the 
firm when and negative when . 
 
If  then in this case, novelty and opportunism emerge since the cognitive 
distance is high (Nooteboom 2000). Hence novelty will appear as new information (I) 




 then filtered information is bigger than received information; that is, that the 
accumulation of the knowledge of agents engaged in collaboration, generated by the 
interaction with the opportunism, is negatively affected by the group of agents engaged in 
opportunism at the time; that will have an effect on because the probability that an 
agent engaged in opportunism to filter information will be high. In this case 
. 
 
With this we have finished analyzing the terms related to the equation (1). 
 
Now, as for the equation (2), we define the neighborhood of agents engaged in 
opportunism/novelty as the complement of , that is . With the cardinal of this set we 
define the rate of the opportunism'/novelty´s growth like . 
 
As for the case of the collaboration, in presence of novelty and filtration of information, 
we have that when  the information acquired by the agent engaged in 
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collaboration is bigger that the one filtered by the agents engaged in opportunism at the 
time. This will impact the , because the probability that an agent engaged in 
collaboration allows an agent engaged in opportunism obtain information at her 
detriment, will be small. This will make the working hours of agents engaged in 
opportunism decrease. 
 
So if  then ; this indicates that the knowledge 
accumulated by the agents engaged in opportunism is smaller than that of the agents 
engaged in collaboration at the time. 
 
By cognitive dimension of the individuals, we can analyze the behavior of the difference 
among the acquired information and the filtered one. In an instant t, each agent has a 
“background” knowledge ; also, as consequence of interacting with others, the agent 
acquires new knowledge . The agent's i cognitive dimension of in the instant t will 
be . 
 
The weight of the “background” knowledge is given by the experience and the education 
acquired by the individual until instant t and the weight acquired knowledge to the 
interaction with other agents, it can be determined with that expression that shows under 
what conditions an individual adopts practical organizational of other agents. 
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According to the Lazaric’s and Raybaut´s (2005) model, the practice is adopted from 
those agents that have a higher organizational practice and are more productive. So the 










t: time measured in hours.   
: level of collaboration in the instant t (time). 
:  level of opportunism in the instant t (time). 
xA : rate of growth of the collaboration in the time t. 
yA : rate of growth of the opportunism in the time t. 
xyA  : probability that the opportunism obtain the collaboration' information. 
yxA  : probability that the collaboration allow the opportunism to obtain information. 
tΩ : matrix of an individual's contacts z in the time t. 
I: new information o novelty. 
F: filtered information. 
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i = 1, 2, 3. . . , N 
N: individuals' number in the company. 
 
:*
tiα  the organizational practice of de agent i adapted to the new knowledge acquired in 
the time t. 




















ijl  is the contact between the agent  with , component ij of the matrix   
 : the knowledge of the agent i in the time t.   
: weight of the knowledge of the agent i in the time t.   
 
    
 : the knowledge acquired by the agent , because of the interaction with other 
individuals in the instant t.   
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